Volume 25
Issue 2 Summer 1995
Summer 1995

Tort Law - New Mexico Examines the Doctrine of Comparative
Fault in the Context of Premises Liability: Reichert v. Atler
Pamela J. Sewell

Recommended Citation
Pamela J. Sewell, Tort Law - New Mexico Examines the Doctrine of Comparative Fault in the Context of
Premises Liability: Reichert v. Atler, 25 N.M. L. Rev. 353 (1995).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol25/iss2/15

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of
Law. For more information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

TORT LAW-New Mexico Examines the Doctrine of
Comparative Fault in the Context of Premises Liability:
Reichert v. Atler
I. INTRODUCTION
In Reichert v. Atler,' the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the
fault of a premises owner who negligently failed to protect patrons from
foreseeable harm may be compared to a third party intentional tortfeasor
who caused the harm. 2 Before Reichert, a premises owner -could be liable
for all of a patron's injuries caused by third parties;3 however, the
Reichert court's holding diminished the premises owner's liability by
allowing a negligent premises owner to apportion his liability among joint
tortfeasors, whether their conduct was "intentional, negligent, or otherwise." ' 4 This Note provides a brief overview of the comparative fault
doctrine in New Mexico, examines the rationale of Reichert, and explores
the application of comparative fault to premises liability after Reichert.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pablo Ochoa killed Alfred Castillo5 in the A-Mi-Gusto Lounge in
Albuquerque on December 20, 1985.6 Both Castillo and Ochoa were
patrons of the bar at the time of the incident. Prior to the shooting, a
bar employee observed Castillo and Ochoa arguing for almost five minutes
but made no attempt to stop the confrontation or summon the police. 7
The argument subsided when Castillo went into the bar's office to cash
his A-Mi-Gusto Lounge paycheck. Castillo told a bar employee that he
feared Ochoa would act violently. Castillo also informed the employee
that he knew Ochoa carried a gun, and that he had heard a rumor that
Ochoa had killed someone in another state. Castillo then returned to the
bar where the argument resumed and escalated. Finally, Ochoa pulled a
pistol, shot Castillo six times, fled from the bar, and escaped apprehension.

1. 117 N.M. 623, 875 P.2d 379 (1994).
2. Id. at 625, 875 P.2d at 381.
3. See Coca v. Arceo, 71 N.M. 186, 189, 376 P.2d 970, 973 (1962) (recognizing the potential
liability for a business owner who could have discovered the harmful act through the exercise of
reasonable care and either controlled the harmful conduct or called the police).
4. Reichert, 117 N.M. at 625, 875 P.2d at 381.
5. Alfred Castillo was a sheetrock installer by trade as well as a musician who played at the
A-Mi-Gusto Lounge. Id. at 624, 875 P.2d at 380.
6. Id. Unless otherwise cited, all subsequent references to the facts of this case refer to Reichert,
117 N.M. at 624, 875 P.2d at 380.
7. The A-Mi-Gusto Lounge had a reputation as being one of the most dangerous bars in
Bernalillo County and had been the scene of numerous shootings, stabbings, and assaults. Nevertheless,
the bar did not employ any professional security personnel. The bouncer that the bar employed
did not arrive at the bar until after this incident. Id.
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As personal representative of Castillo's estate, Joseph Reichert brought

a wrongful death action8 against Tony and Josie Atler. 9 Reichert claimed
that the Atlers breached their duty as premises owners to provide adequate
security to protect bar patrons from foreseeable harm. The Atlers attempted to place all the fault on Ochoa. 10 The trial court, however,
found that the Atlers had breached their duty to Castillo, and held them
liable for all damages. The Atlers appealed. 1" The New Mexico Court
of Appeals held that the actions of the Atlers and Ochoa should be
compared under the doctrine of comparative negligence. 2 The supreme
court affirmed the court of appeals, allowing for comparison of fault
between a negligent premises owner and a third party intentional tortfeasor.
III.

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN NEW MEXICO

Apportionment of Fault between Plaintiff and Defendant
New Mexico abandoned the doctrine of contributory negligence' 3 and4
adopted the doctrine of pure comparative negligence in Scott v. Rizzo.'
Pure comparative negligence holds "all parties fully responsible for their
own respective acts to the degree that those acts have caused harm" by

A.

8. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2-1 to -4 (Repl. Pamp. 1989). New Mexico's Wrongful Death
Act allows for a personal injury claim to survive the death of the injured. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 412-1. The Act requires that every such action "shall be brought by and in the name of the personal
representative or representatives of such deceased person." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-3.
9. Tony and Josie Atler were the owners of the A-Mi-Gusto Lounge at the time of the shooting.
Reichert, 117 N.M. at 623, 875 P.2d at 379.
10. Id.
11. Id. The Atlers raised the following three issues on appeal:
(1) whether the failure to join an indispensable party [wihom the Atlers claim is
the actual owner] constitutes a jurisdictional defect requiring reversal; (2) whether
there was substantial evidence indicating that Defendants had notice that the decedent
was in danger; and (3) whether the amount of the award against Defendants should
be reduced under the doctrine of comparative fault.
Reichert v. Atler, 117 N.M. 628, 628, 875 P.2d 384, 384 (Ct. App. 1992), aff'd, 117 N.M. 623,
875 P.2d 379 (1994).
The court of appeals held that the Atlers could not prevail on the indispensable party claim
because they made no showing of prejudice to the absent party. Id. at 630, 875 P.2d at 386. The
court also held that the district court properly decided the second issue. Id. at 632, 875 P.2d at
388.
12. See id. at 635, 875 P.2d at 391. The court of appeals focused on the basic principle of
fairness underlying the pure form of comparative negligence adopted in Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M.
682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981). The court held that "to impose liability on a negligent tortfeasor beyond
the percentage of that tortfeasor's comparative fault is to impose liability without fault." Id. at
636, 875 P.2d at 392.
13. Contributory negligence served as an absolute bar to a plaintiff's recovery of damages when
there was a finding of any fault by the plaintiff. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 65 at 451-52 (5th ed. 1984). The harshness of contributory negligence upon
the plaintiff was readily apparent because it barred any recovery even when the plaintiff was only
minimally at fault. See id.
14. 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981). In Scott, the court did not address whether the comparative
fault doctrine apportions fault to other than negligent tortfeasors. The court explicitly stated that
the doctrine applies "between or among negligent parties whose negligence proximately causes any
part of a loss or injury." Id. at 688, 634 P.2d at 1240 (emphasis added).
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denying recovery for one's own fault and permitting recovery to the
extent of another's fault. 5 In pure comparative fault, a plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar his recovery altogether, but does serve
to reduce his damages in proportion to his fault.16 Thus, while the doctrine
of comparative fault considers the plaintiff's misconduct when determining
the liability arising from an accident, it abandons the "all-or-nothing"
approach of contributory negligence. 17 However, a number of courts have
declined to employ the doctrine of comparative fault when comparing
the negligent acts of a plaintiff with the intentional tortious conduct of
the defendant."
B.

Apportionment of Damages between Joint Tortfeasors
1.

New Mexico Applies Several Liability to Joint Tortfeasors

In Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc.,'9 the court of appeals
held that, in a comparative negligence case, one concurrent tortfeasor
cannot be held liable for the fault of other concurrent tortfeasors. 20 The
court reasoned that the adoption of pure comparative negligence involved
more than the removal of contributory negligence as a bar to recovery;
it also recognized the fact finder's ability to apportion degrees of fault
among defendants. 21 The Bartlett court, therefore, expanded New Mexico's
doctrine of comparative negligence by rejecting joint and several liability 22
in favor of the rule that each individual tortfeasor should be held
responsible only for his or her percentage of the harm.2 1

15. Id. at 690, 634 P.2d at 1242.
16. See Joseph Goldberg, Judicial Adoption of Comparative Fault in New Mexico: The Time
is at Hand, 10 N.M. L.

REV.

3, 6 (1979).

17. Id.
18. By viewing intentional conduct as "different in kind" from negligence, these courts do not
compare intentional acts with negligent acts. See, e.g., Bell v. Mickelsen, 710 F.2d 611 (10th Cir.
1983) (holding that an intentional tort is not "negligence"
in the strict sense "since it involves
intent rather than inadvertence, and is positive rather than negative"); Lynn v. Taylor, 642 P.2d
131 (Kan. App. 2d 1982) (concluding that because an intentional tort had no fault basis with which
negligence could compare, it was difficult to envision how a court could apply comparative fault

principles to intentional torts).
19. 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
20. Id. at 159, 646 P.2d at 586.
21. See id. at 155, 646 P.2d at 582. This line of reasoning logically follows the supreme court's
recognition in Scott of the fact finder's ability to apportion degrees of negligence between the
plaintiff and the defendant. See id. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585.
22. Joint and several liability allows a plaintiff to collect the entire judgment from any one
tortfeasor even if the wrongdoing of that tortfeasor only contributed to a small part of the harm
inflicted. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 52, at 350-51.
23. Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 159, 646 P.2d at 586. Bartlett involved an automobile accident which
resulted when a phantom driver swerved off and then back onto the road, causing the defendant
to hit the plaintiff. The court determined that the fault of the phantom party must be considered

because "[f]airness dictates that the blameworthiness of all actors in an incident be treated on a
consistent basis." Id. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585.
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The New Mexico legislature codified Bartlett's abolition of joint and
several liability in section 41-3A-1 24 of the New Mexico statutes, the
Several Liability Act. 25 The Several Liability Act imposed several liability
upon concurrent tortfeasors whenever the doctrine of comparative fault

applies. 26 The statute provides for joint and several liability in situations

involving intentional torts, vicarious liability, strict products liability, or
in other situations having a sound basis in public policy. 27 These exceptions
represent a compromise enacted by the New Mexico legislature; 28 the first
three exceptions allow courts to apply joint and several liability where
the facts are consistent with one of the enumerated exceptions, while the
public policy exception offers courts flexibility to adapt to future cir-

cumstances .29

Apportionment of Damages in New Mexico between Negligent
and Intentional Tortfeasors
New Mexico first addressed the apportionment of fault between a
negligent and an intentional tortfeasor in Medina v. Graham's Cowboys,
Inc. 3° The Medina court looked to the fairness notions embodied in both
2.

24. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3A-1 to -2 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
In any cause of action to which the doctrine of comparative fault applies, the
doctrine imposing joint and several liability upon two or more wrongdoers whose
conduct proximately caused an injury to any plaintiff is abolished except as otherwise
provided hereafter. The liability of any such defendants shall be several.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-l(A).
25. The Several Liability Act became effective on July 1, 1987, after Reichert filed the complaint
against the Atlers. Thus, as the court of appeals noted, the statute has no application to the present
proceeding. See Reichert v. Atler, 117 N.M. 628, 635, 875 P.2d 384, 391 (Ct. App. 1992), aff'd,
117 N.M. 623, 875 P.2d 379 (1994).
26. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-I(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989), there are some exceptions to this
liability, however. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-I(B)-(G).
27. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C) provides as follows:
The doctrine imposing joint and several liability shall apply: (i) to any person or
persons who acted with the intention of inflicting injury or damage; (2) to any
persons whose relationship to each other would make one person vicariously liable
for the acts of the other, . . . (3) to any persons strictly liable for the manufacture
and sale of a defective product, . . . or (4) to situations not covered by any of
the foregoing and having a sound basis in public policy.
Id.
28. The original draft contained no exceptions to several liability; in essence, the proposal was
for pure comparative fault which was ultimately amended to contain exceptions for intentional torts,
vicarious liability, strict products liability, or a sound basis in public policy. Compare S. 164, 38th
Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 1987) (containing no exceptions) with N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C) (containing
four exceptions).
29. Saiz v. Belen School District, 113 N.M. 387, 827 P.2d 102 (1992), is the only New Mexico
case to employ the public policy exception of § 41-3A-1(C)(4) of the Several Liability Act. In Saiz,
New Mexico addressed the apportionment of fault between concurrent tortfeasors when a wrongful
death action was brought on behalf of a young boy electrocuted at a high school football game.
Id. at 391, 827 P.2d at 106. The court reasoned that a special public policy exists "to protect third
persons in an area of inherent danger and to encourage conscientious adherence to standards of
safety where injury will result in the absence of precautions." Id. at 400, 827 P.2d at 115.
30. 113 N.M. 471, 827 P.2d 859 (Ct. App. 1992). In Medina, a bar patron filed a personal
injury complaint against the doorman and the bar owner after the doorman assaulted him in the
bar parking lot. The complaint alleged negligent hiring and supervision of the doorman by the bar
owner. Id. at 472, 827 P.2d at 860. The Several Liability Act did not apply to this case because
the complaint was filed before the Act's enactment. Id. at 474, 827 P.2d at 862.
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the adoption of pure comparative negligence in Scott and the abolition
of joint and several liability between negligent tortfeasors in Bartlett.1
The court suggested that "[ilt would seem inconsistent with this approach
to hold a negligent tortfeasor responsible for the entirety of the damage
if the concurrent tortfeasor happens to have committed an intentional
tort rather than a negligent tort." 3 2 Ultimately, however, the court determined that the abolition of joint and several liability "does not necessarily undermine principles of vicarious liability" 3 and held that joint
and several liability applies to an employer who is liable for negligently
34
hiring an intentional tortfeasor.
IV.

COMPARISON BETWEEN NEGLIGENT AND INTENTIONAL
TORTFEASORS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Few comparative negligence jurisdictions have directly addressed the
question of whether and how to apportion fault between tortfeasors when
the conduct of one is negligent and the conduct of the other is intentional.
Moreover, the jurisdictions that have addressed this issue vary in their
application of the doctrine of comparative negligence, leaving New Mexico
without much helpful authority before Reichert.
Kansas has declined to allow comparison of fault between negligent
and intentional joint tortfeasors, basing its decision on the special duty
of the negligent tortfeasor to protect the patron-plaintiff from the intentional tortious acts of a third person.35 In Kansas State Bank & Trust
Co. v. Specialized Transportation Service, Inc. ,36 the Kansas Supreme
Court expanded this doctrine to include negligent hiring and retention
cases.1 7 The court reasoned that the "intentional acts of a third party
cannot be compared with the negligent acts of a defendant whose duty
it is to protect the plaintiff from the intentional acts committed by the
third party." 38

31. Id. at 474, 827 P.2d at 862.'
32. Id. at 475, 827 P.2d at 863.
33. Id. Respondeat superior renders a faultless employer liable for torts committed by an employee
in the course and scope of employment. Id. (citing Gonzales v. Southwest Security and Protection
Agency, 100 N.M. 54, 665 P.2d 810 (Ct. App. 1983)). "Because liability is not predicated on the
fault of the employer, the abolition of joint and several liability does not eliminate respondeat
superior liability." Id.
34. Medina, 113 N.M. at 475, 827 P.2d at 863.
35. See Gould v. Taco Bell, 722 P.2d 511 (Kan. 1986) (breach of duty of premises owner to
protect invitees not subject to comparison with the intentional tort of another patron); M. Bruenger
& Co. v. Dodge.City Truck Stop, Inc., 675 P.2d 864 (Kan. 1984) (comparing negligent acts of
bailee to the intentional acts of a thief not allowed under the comparative negligence doctrine).
36. 819 P.2d 587 (Kan. 1991).
37. See id. at 606. The court stated that the general rule in Kansas is to "look to the nature
of the duty owed in each instance" whether it be a bailment, premises liability, or a negligent
hiring and retention case. Id. (quoting Gould, 722 P.2d at 517). In Kansas State Bank & Trust
Co., the court found that the defendants had a special duty stemming from the negligent hiring
and retention of the third party. Id. This special duty encompassed the duty to prevent the intentional
act of battery committed by the third party. Id.
38. Id. at 605-06 (citing Gould, 722 P.2d at 516).
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Conversely, jurisdictions which allow for comparison between negligent
and intentional tortfeasors have based their decisions on the notion that
all parties should share fault in proportion to the culpability of their
acts.3 9 For example, in Blazovic v. Andrich, the New Jersey Supreme
Court viewed intentional wrongdoing and negligence as "different in
degree," not "different in kind." 40 In view of this distinction, the jury's
apportionment of fault would reflect appropriate levels of each tortfeasor's

culpability .41

Similarly, in Weidenfeller v. Star and Garter,42 the California Court
of Appeals limited the liability of a negligent tortfeasor to its percentage
of fault when the intentional acts of a third party contributed to the
plaintiff's damages.4 3 The Weidenfeller court stated that failing to apply
comparative fault principles to joint tortfeasors "not only frustrates the
purpose of the statute but violates the common sense notion that a more
culpable party should bear the financial burden caused by its intentional
act."44
V.

RATIONALE OF THE REICHERT COURT

The New Mexico Supreme Court held in Reichert that the fault of a
premises owner who negligently failed to protect patrons from foreseeable
harm may be compared to a third party intentional tortfeasor who actually
caused the harm. The Reichert court acknowledged that a premises owner
has a duty to protect patrons from injury caused by third parties. 45 The
court viewed a person's duty to protect another from the foreseeable act
of a third party as an important determinant of liability and reiterated
that "[t]he owner's duty to protect patrons extends to all foreseeable
harm regardless of whether that harm results from intentional or negligent
conduct." ' 46 The court held that the breach of this duty triggers comparative fault principles: the premises owner's negligent failure to protect
patrons from injury may be compared to the third party whose intentional

39. See, e.g., Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222 (N.J. 1991). The court held that the apportionment
of fault according to each party's relative degree of fault, whether it be intentional or negligent,
is consistent with the evolution of comparative negligence and joint tortfeasor liability. Id. at 231.
40. Id.
41. Id. This view adheres to the guiding principle of comparative fault, which is "to distribute
the loss in proportion to the respective faults of the parties causing that loss." Id.
42. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
43. See id. at 16.
44. Id.
45. See Reichert, 117 N.M. at 626, 875 P.2d at 382. Reichert relied on Coca v. Arceo, which
held:
[Tihe proprietor of a place of business who holds it out to the public for entry
for his business purposes, is subject to liability to guests who are upon the premises
and who are injured by the harmful acts of third persons if, by the exercise of
reasonable care, the proprietor could have discovered that such acts were being
done or about to be done, and could have protected against the injury by controlling
the conduct of the other patron.
Id. (quoting Coca, 71 N.M. at 189, 376 P.2d at 973).
46. Reichert, 117 N.M. at 626, 875 P.2d at 382.
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conduct actually caused the injury. 47 Therefore, in accordance with Bartlett's abolition of joint and several liability, the court held each tortfeasor
liable for the proportion of fault attributable to his conduct. 48
In reaching its decision, the Reichert court rejected both the rationale
and holdings of cases from other comparative negligence jurisdictions
that refused to apportion fault between negligent and intentional joint
tortfeasors. 49 The court adopted the result of jurisdictions that allow for
comparison between negligent premises owners and intentional third party
tortfeasors5 0 The court based its decision on New Mexico's adoption of
comparative fault in Scott and its abolition of joint and several liability
in Bartlett.'
Unlike the court of appeals, the supreme court also examined the
Several Liability Act. 2 The court determined that public policy would
support the holding that the bar owner may reduce his liability by the
percentage of fault attributable to a third party." Additionally, the court
focused on the Act to support its rationale that an intentional party
4
should not escape responsibility through the negligence of another party.1
The Reichert court recognized both the importance of the premises
owner's duty to prevent the harmful conduct of a third party and the
harshness of holding the premises owner fully liable for this conduct."

47. See id. at 624, 875 P.2d at 380. The court narrowly defined its holding by stating that the
issue of "whether the conduct of the third party is intentional, negligent, or otherwise is not
determinative in the application of comparative-fault principles in situations similar to the one
presented in this case." Id. at 625, 875 P.2d at 381.
48. Id. (citing Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 159, 646 P.2d at 586). Ochoa would be jointly and severally
liable if sued directly. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). Comparative fault
of an intentional tortfeasor only arises when he or she is brought into the case as a third party
due to absence or insolvency; otherwise the intentional tortfeasor would be jointly and severally
liable. See id.
49. See Kansas State Bank & Trust Co., 819 P.2d at 606 (no comparison allowed between the
negligent and intentional tortfeasors); Gould, 722 P.2d at 516, 517 (the special duty of the negligent
tortfeasor to protect the plaintiff from the intentional tortfeasor's acts precludes comparison of
fault); M. Bruenger & Company, Inc., 675 P.2d at 867-70 (comparative negligence doctrine does
not allow comparison of negligent acts of defendant with the intentional acts of a third party).
See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
50. See Blazovic, 590 A.2d 222 (fault apportionment allowed in accordance with each party's
relative degree of fault); Weidenfeller, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 14 (comparison allowed between the negligent
and intentional tortfeasors when both contributed to the plaintiff's damages). See supra notes 3544 and accompanying text.
51. Reichert, 117 N.M. at 625, 875 P.2d at 381. "[Tlhe basis for comparative fault is that each
individual tortfeasor should be held responsible only for his or her percentage of the harm." Id.
(citing Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 159, 646 P.2d at 586).
52. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1. The supreme court failed to address the fact that the filing
date preceded the enactment of the Several Liability Act even though the court of appeals explicitly
stated that "the statute . . . has no application to the present proceeding." Reichert v. Atler, 117
N.M. 628, 635, 875 P.2d 384, 391 (Ct. App. 1992), aff'd, 117 N.M. 623, 875 P.2d 379; see supra
note 25.
53. Reichert, 117 N.M. at 625, 875 P.2d at 381; see also Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 159, 646 P.2d
at 586. The basis for comparative fault is that each individual tortfeasor should be held responsible
only for his percentage of the harm. Id.
I"
54. Reichert, 117 N.M. at 626, 875 P.2d at 382. Joint and several liability applies "to any
person or persons who acted with the intention of inflicting injury or damage." N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-3A-l(C)(l).
55. Reichert, 117 N.M. at 626, 875 P.2d at 382.
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The court balanced these competing interests by proposing a jury instruction. The jury instruction seeks to inform the jury of the owner's
duty to prevent foreseeable harm to patrons and "how that duty relates
to the conduct of third persons." 5 6 The proposed jury instruction integrates
the principle of comparative fault with premises liability:
If you find that the [owner][operator] of the [place of business]
breached [his][her][its] duty to use ordinary care to keep the premises
safe for use by the visitor, you may compare this breach of duty
with the conduct of the third person(s) who actually caused the injury
to the plaintiff(s) and apportion fault accordingly. In apportioning
this fault, you should consider that the [owner's][operator's] duty to
protect visitors arises from the likelihood that a third party will injure
a visitor and, as the risk of danger increases, the amount of care to
be exercised by the [owner][operator] also increases. Therefore, the
reduced
proportionate fault of the [owner][operator] is not necessarily
7
by the increasingly wrongful conduct of the third party.
Theoretically, this instruction allows the jury to consider the importance
of the owner's duty to patrons and weigh the owner's failure to perform
that duty with a third party's tortious conduct.
VI.

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

The Reichert court's expansion of the comparative fault doctrine dramatically changes the traditional theory of premises liability in New
Mexico. Prior to Reichert, a premises owner was generally liable for
injuries to patrons caused by third parties when the premises owner could
have both discovered the third parties' acts through reasonable care and
protected against injury by controlling the third parties' conduct.5" After
Reichert, the premises owner is able to compare his breach of duty with
the negligent, intentional or reckless conduct of a third party. This holding
diminishes the duty owed by the premises owner to the patron, because
the premises owner can seek to reduce his percentage of fault by comparing
degrees of fault with the third party intentional tortfeasor. Moreover, in
the case of an absent third party intentional tortfeasor, the jury might
find it hard to resist bending the general rules if they construe the
proposed jury instruction as unduly harsh on a premises-owner defendant.5 9
The Reichert court legitimized diminishing a premises owner's liability
to patrons through the proposed jury instruction. 60 Even though the
proposed jury instruction addresses the increasing duty of the premises

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
59. See Goldberg, supra note 16, at 5 ("Even men who respect general rules find it hard to
) (quoting LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
resist bending them in individual, touching cases.
OF AMERICAN LAW

412 (1973)).

60. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
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owner to exercise reasonable care in the face of intentional tortfeasors, 61
the interpretation and application of this instruction is left to the jury.
The proposed jury instruction leaves the potential for unfairness to a
plaintiff if the premises owner successfully shifts a disproportionate amount
62
of blame to an intentional third party joint tortfeasor.
The decision in Reichert and its subsequent discussion in the case of
Barth v. Coleman61 indicates the judiciary's willingness to expand the
doctrine of comparative fault based on the Scott and Bartlett principles
of fairness. In Barth, the supreme court addressed the identical issue
faced by the Reichert court: whether the negligent failure of a premises
owner to protect patrons from foreseeable harm should be compared to
64
the intentional actions of the third party who actually caused the harm.
The Barth court had the opportunity to create a public policy exception
to several liability under section 41-3A-1(C)(4) of the Several Liability
66
Act; 65 instead, the court reaffirmed its holding in Reichert.
In the future, the New Mexico courts should consider using the public
policy exception to several liability in those premises liability cases that
involve the sale of alcohol. As stated above, the Several Liability Act
provides that joint and several liability shall apply to situations "having
a sound basis in public policy." ' 67 New Mexico already recognizes a strong
public policy to curb alcohol-related violence as demonstrated by New
Mexico's Dramshop Act 68 and by Lopez v. Maez.69 Thus, while the
Reichert decision diminished a premises owner's liability, the proliferation
of alcohol-related violence could result in the court creating a public
policy exception by focusing on the nature of the premises in order to
curb alcohol-related violence.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Reichert court expanded the comparative fault doctrine to include
apportionment of fault between a negligent defendant and a third party

61. "[Tlhe proportionate fault of the [owner][operator] is not necessarily reduced by the increasingly wrongful conduct of the third party." Reichert, 117 N.M. at 626, 875 P.2d at 382.
62. Unfairness arises for plaintiffs in the case of an absent or insolvent third party tortfeasor
because of the diminished likelihood for the plaintiff recovering from this tortfeasor.
63. 118 N.M. 1, 878 P.2d 319 (1994) (holding that the negligent defendant's liability must be
reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to the third party intentional tortfeasor).
64. Barth involved a verbal confrontation between two nightclub patrons that escalated into a
fistfight. Before the fight, Barth reported the incident to a nightclub employee who took no subsequent
action to control the situation or to prevent escalation of the verbal confrontation. Id. at 2, 878
P.2d at 320.
65. Barth brought suit several months after a February 1989 bar fight. Thus, the Several Liability
Act, effective beginning July 1, 1987, was applicable to the proceeding.
66. The Barth court held that the negligent defendant's liability must be reduced by the percentage
of fault attributable to the third party intentional tortfeasor. Id. at 4, 878 P.2d at 322.
67. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C)(4) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
68. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1989) (imposing liability on bar owners who
enhance the dangers of violence by serving alcohol to known dangerous, inebriated patrons).
69. 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982). In Lopez, a victim of an automobile accident brought
action against a liquor licensee for the negligent sale of liquor to the inebriated driver. The court
held that a tavern owner may be held liable for the acts of intoxicated persons that were reasonably
foreseeable. Id. at 632, 651 P.2d at 1269.
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tortfeasor, regardless of whether the third party tortfeasor acted intentionally, negligently, or recklessly. The application of comparative fault
to a negligent premises owner provides the premises owner with an avenue
to reduce liability; the proposed jury instruction then compensates for
the potential unfairness to the plaintiff by increasing the amount of care
that the premises owner must exercise in the face of an increasing risk
of danger. Ultimately, the jury is left to determine who bears the responsibility for the plaintiff's injuries, but the jury instruction provides
a mechanism to apply the Scott and Bartlett principles of fairness.
PAMELA J. SEWELL

